Anchoring in Numeric Judgments of Visual Stimuli by Linda Langeborg & Mårten Eriksson
fpsyg-07-00225 February 19, 2016 Time: 17:10 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 23 February 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00225
Edited by:
Petko Kusev,
Kingston University London, UK
Reviewed by:
Tetiana Zaporozhets,
National Aviation University, Ukraine
and Kingston University London, UK
David Copeland,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA
*Correspondence:
Linda Langeborg
linda.langeborg@hig.se
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognition,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 19 October 2015
Accepted: 03 February 2016
Published: 23 February 2016
Citation:
Langeborg L and Eriksson M (2016)
Anchoring in Numeric Judgments
of Visual Stimuli.
Front. Psychol. 7:225.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00225
Anchoring in Numeric Judgments of
Visual Stimuli
Linda Langeborg* and Mårten Eriksson
Faculty of Health and Occupational Studies, Department of Social Work and Psychology, University of Gävle, Gävle, Sweden
This article investigates effects of anchoring in age estimation and estimation of
quantities, two tasks which to different extents are based on visual stimuli. The results
are compared to anchoring in answers to classic general knowledge questions that rely
on semantic knowledge. Cognitive load was manipulated to explore possible differences
between domains. Effects of source credibility, manipulated by differing instructions
regarding the selection of anchor values (no information regarding anchor selection,
information that the anchors are randomly generated or information that the anchors
are answers from an expert) on anchoring were also investigated. Effects of anchoring
were large for all types of judgments but were not affected by cognitive load or by
source credibility in either one of the researched domains. A main effect of cognitive
load on quantity estimations and main effects of source credibility in the two visually
based domains indicate that the manipulations were efficient. Implications for theoretical
explanations of anchoring are discussed. In particular, because anchoring did not
interact with cognitive load, the results imply that the process behind anchoring in visual
tasks is predominantly automatic and unconscious.
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INTRODUCTION
Estimations of unknown quantities in our environment are a part of everyday life. For example,
estimating the age of a new acquaintance or estimating how many cookies there are left in the
cookie jar are activities that most people have performed. Such numerical estimations are often
influenced by available anchors or standards. If someone was told another person’s estimation of
the age of a new acquaintance or of how many cookies there are left in the jar, their estimate would
probably be influenced by the other person’s estimates.
Anchoring effects – the assimilation of numeric estimates to previously considered standards
(i.e., anchors) – are a robust finding from studies of heuristics and biases in judgments under
uncertainty (as in the classical paradigm initiated by Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The effects
occur although participants are told to disregard from the anchor value in their estimates
(Mussweiler and Strack, 1999), when anchors are presented without explicit instructions to
compare the anchor value with the target (Brewer and Chapman, 2002), and even when the anchors
are presented subliminally (Mussweiler and Englich, 2005).
Several psychological mechanisms have been suggested to explain anchoring. Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) originally treated anchoring as a judgmental heuristic and proposed that
anchoring is the result of insufficient adjustment from the anchor. However, studies (e.g., Schkade
and Johnson, 1989; Chapman and Johnson, 2002) have failed to find evidence of adjustment in
the standard anchoring paradigm. Epley and Gilovich (2001, 2004, 2005, 2006) have questioned
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 225
fpsyg-07-00225 February 19, 2016 Time: 17:10 # 2
Langeborg and Eriksson Anchoring in Numeric Judgments of Visual Stimuli
insufficient adjustment as a general explanation for the
anchoring effect, by showing that adjustment only seems to
occur in tasks requiring participants to base their judgment
on anchors that are self-generated, rather than provided by
the experimenter. Whereas experimenter-provided anchors are
values that participants are told explicitly to compare their
estimate with (e.g., “Is the population of Chicago more or
less than 200,000?”), self-generated anchors are values used
spontaneously by the participant as starting points from
which they adjust their estimate, without instructions from the
experimenter (e.g., for a question about the freezing point of
vodka, participants may anchor their estimate in the freezing
point of water which they, supposedly, are familiar with).
Adjustment is seen as effortful and cognitively demanding, and
is thereby affected (i.e., by being terminated too early) by factors
that diminishes the ability to dedicate cognitive resources to
a task. Epley and Gilovich (2006) manipulated cognitive load,
motivation, and even moderate intoxication and showed that
these factors affected adjustment from self-generated anchors,
although they did not influence responses in the standard
anchoring paradigm. The effect of cognitive load on anchoring
to self-generated anchors was interpreted as evidence of the same
cognitive resources being taxed.
In the standard anchoring paradigm, with experimenter-
provided anchors, anchors have been suggested to increase
the availability of anchor-consistent information by causing
people to recruit biased pools of information (Chapman and
Johnson, 1994, 1999; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). The Selective
Accessibility Model by Strack and Mussweiler (1997), Mussweiler
and Strack (1999) posits that anchoring is produced by enhanced
accessibility of information consistent with the suggested anchor.
Respondents in the standard paradigm are typically asked to
answer a comparative question (i.e., “Is the target value more
or less than the anchor value?”) and then to give an absolute
estimate of the target value. The model suggests that participants
in the standard paradigm test the hypothesis that the target value
is equal to the anchor value and that by testing this hypothesis,
participants will selectively search for information indicating that
the target is similar to the anchor, which enhances the accessibility
of information consistent with the anchor value. Cognitive
processes involving hypothesis testing are usually considered as
cognitively demanding (Mussweiler and Strack, 2001) and would
therefore be sensitive to cognitive load, although the activation of
semantic knowledge related to the target has been compared with
semantic priming (Mussweiler and Strack, 1999) and thus may be
regarded as a rather automatic process.
Judgments have also been shown to be affected by anchors
semantically unrelated to the absolute question (Chapman and
Bornstein, 1996; Wilson et al., 1996; Wong and Kwong, 2000;
Oppenheimer et al., 2008). Because semantic activation is not
involved in these situations, the applicability of the Selective
Accessibility Model in such situations has been questioned.
Instead, simple numeric priming has been suggested to produce
anchoring in these situations, and several researchers propose
explanations of anchoring that focus on the anchors’ numerical
values or magnitude rather than their semantic meaning (e.g.,
Wong and Kwong, 2000; Oppenheimer et al., 2008; Frederick
and Mochon, 2012; Sleeth-Keppler, 2013). However, as numeric
priming seems to be unable to account for findings showing that
anchoring is dependent on changes in the judgmental dimension
of the target (e.g., smaller effects of anchor values indicating the
weight rather than the height of the Brandenburg Gate, when the
height is to be estimated, Strack and Mussweiler, 1997), several
researchers (e.g., Mussweiler and Strack, 2001; Oppenheimer
et al., 2008) propose that different kinds of priming are activated
in different situations, or in some cases even simultaneously.
Anchoring has been predominantly researched in answers to
general knowledge questions (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974;
Mussweiler and Strack, 1999; Epley and Gilovich, 2001), but
anchoring effects have been demonstrated in a number of other
areas as well, including probability estimations (Chapman and
Johnson, 1999), legal judgments (Englich and Mussweiler, 2001),
and forecasting (Critcher and Gilovich, 2008) – see Furnham and
Boo (2011) for a review. All these domains are rather abstract
and rely on semantic knowledge. Even though tasks such as
age estimation or estimation of how many cookies that remain
in the jar certainly involve estimation of uncertain numerical
quantities, the standard anchoring paradigm has not yet been
applied to such simple judgments (but see Sörqvist et al., 2011 for
research on the own-anchor effect). The present study extends
previous research by exploring anchor effects in judgments that
are supported by concrete visual stimuli from pictures, namely
age estimates of men and estimation of quantities of items in a
container.
Age estimations are particularly interesting in the anchoring
domain for several reasons. First of all, the estimates are generally
supported by visual stimuli. Moreover, age estimates are regularly
exercised in our daily lives, and human age is also restricted
to a rather narrow span (few people are over 100 years old).
Consequently, age estimates are generally quite accurate (see
Rhodes, 2009, for a review), and are thus associated with
higher certainty than estimates to the tasks typically used in the
standard anchoring paradigm. Of course, age estimates are rarely
100% correct, and some uncertainty always remains, but while
uncertainty in the value to be estimated is a classical assumption
of anchoring, it is presently unclear whether anchor effects will
prevail when judgments become more accurate. We therefore
include age estimates in the present study to determine whether
standard anchoring effects extend to judgments made under
higher certainty than in the classical paradigm. Possible effects
of anchoring in age estimation are also of applied importance, as
eyewitnesses often are asked to estimate the age of the perpetrator
(van Koppen and Lochun, 1997; Pozzulo and Warren, 2003).
Estimations of quantities of objects are, like age estimations,
supported by visual stimuli. However, estimations of quantities
of objects are not restricted to a specific range of values and
there is no reason to assume they are made with higher certainty
than other tasks typically employed in the anchoring literature.
Furthermore, while age estimates also rest on some semantic
knowledge (e.g., of the normal aging process), estimation of
quantities of items in a container lacks semantic content. This
makes quantity estimations crucial for the Selective Accessibility
Model. If anchoring occurs although there are no anchor-
consistent cues to be made accessible, anchoring in this domain
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cannot possibly be attributable to the Selective Accessibility
Model, which would reduce the generalizability of the model.
Instead, such results would be indicative of perspectives focused
more on priming of numbers or magnitudes (e.g., Wilson
et al., 1996; Wong and Kwong, 2000; Oppenheimer et al.,
2008). Also, the unique characteristics of estimation of quantities
(the visual dependence and low semantic content) means
that the finding of anchor effects in quantity estimations
would further extend the previously assumed boundaries of
anchoring.
In the present study, cognitive load is manipulated to explore
the anchoring processes in the two new visual domains and
to compare the effects to that of anchoring in responses
to general knowledge questions. Differences in the effects of
cognitive load between domains would be indicative of different
processes. Cognitive load serves here as an indication of
whether anchoring is driven by cognitively demanding processes
such as successive adjustment, or by more automatic and
unconscious processes. Also, although Epley and Gilovich (2006)
have shown that cognitive load does not affect anchoring to
experimenter-provided anchors, they measured anchoring in
terms of adjustment (by subtracting the estimation from the
anchor value), rather than in more conventional anchoring
measures. In the present study, we investigate if cognitive
load interact with anchoring to experimenter-provided anchors,
measured more conventionally, by mean differences between
estimates based on high anchors and estimates based on low
anchors. Because cognitive processes involving hypothesis testing
are considered as cognitively demanding (Mussweiler and Strack,
2001), an effect of cognitive load would be expected for
such tasks. However, as the activation of semantic knowledge
related to the target has been compared to semantic priming
(Mussweiler and Strack, 1999), it may be regarded as a rather
automatic process and no effect of cognitive load would thus
be expected. The effect of cognitive load on judgments within
the selective accessibility paradigm is therefore still an open
question.
In addition, the effect of source credibility is investigated. In
experiments on anchoring, participants are generally informed
that the anchors are randomly selected. The argument for
this is that, without this information, the participants would
assume that the experimenter has good reasons for presenting
that particular value and that it might serve as a clue to the
right answer (in adherence to the maxim of communication
relevance that posits that not only is all relevant information
given in a conversation but also that all given information
is relevant, Grice, 1975). Although it is well known that
anchoring occurs even with this information about randomly
selected anchors, no study has yet investigated whether or
not information about randomly selected anchor values
actually is associated with weaker anchoring, compared to no
information about anchor selection. Recent work (Wegener
et al., 2010; Dowd et al., 2014) indicates that participants do
take information about anchor origin into account, because
participants show higher confidence and place higher weight
on the anchor in answers to general knowledge questions
when it comes from high-credible (estimators knowledgeable
in the domain) compared with low-credible (estimators not
knowledgeable in the domain) sources. Glöckner and Englich
(2015) have also found effects of relevance in anchoring in
juridical decisions, with stronger anchor effects for relevant
(concerning the case which sentence were to be decided)
than irrelevant (concerning a completely different case)
anchors.
To investigate the effect of information about source
credibility on anchoring, participants in the present study were
given different information as to the selection of the anchor
values: one group was given information that the anchor values
were randomly chosen (low credibility group); one group was
given information that the anchor values were answers from
an expert in the relevant domain (high credibility group); and
one group was not given any information about the selection
of the anchor values (control group). Based on earlier studies
(Wegener et al., 2010; Dowd et al., 2014), an interaction between
source credibility and anchor effects would be expected, with
larger anchoring effects for participants given information that
the anchor values were answers from an expert in the field than
for participants given information that the anchor values were
randomly chosen. However, because the two new domains in
our study are concrete and visually based, and associated with
lower degrees of uncertainty than in the abstract tasks used
earlier, it can be argued that the participants have a better chance
to make their own judgments in these domains. This opens
for participants to question the expert’s expertise and put less
weight to their answers (i.e., the anchor values). Thus, it is not
clear what effect the introduction of anchor values provided
by an expert will have on the two visual domains tasks. For
the abstract general knowledge tasks, however, an interaction
between source credibility and anchoring, as described above, was
expected.
In sum, the purpose of the present study was to investigate
anchor effects in two visual domains with different levels of
certainty and different levels of semantic content. Cognitive load
was manipulated to explore possible differences in the processes
behind anchoring in the different domains. If the process behind
anchoring in the two visual domains is similar to the process
behind anchoring in answers to general knowledge questions,
the effect of cognitive load should be the same for each of
the researched domains. Also, we investigated the effect of the
often used information about random selection of anchor values
by manipulating source credibility. Higher effects of anchoring
were hypothesized when the anchor value came from an expert
compared to randomly generated values, at least for the general
knowledge tasks.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Totally, 144 students at the University of Gävle (90 women and 54
men) with a mean age of 24 years (range= 18–49 years) served as
participants and received a cinema voucher for participation. All
participants were healthy adults and participated under informed
consent (confirmed by signing a form). The experiment caused
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no harm to any part and the identity of the participants has been
kept confidential. All ethical guidelines given by the American
Psychological Association were respected.
Materials
Estimations in the general knowledge domain were based on
eight knowledge questions used by Jacowitz and Kahneman
(1995), but adapted to a Swedish context. Age estimations were
based on eight full body photographs of men aged 28–47 years.
Quantity estimations were based on photographs of eight glass
containers with different items (e.g., beads and nails). See Table 1
for details of the material.
Design and Procedure
The experiment had a 2 (Anchor value: high or low) × 2
(Cognitive load: load or no load) × 3 (Source credibility: high,
low, or control) repeated measure design with Anchor value and
Cognitive load as within-subject variables and Source credibility
as between-subject variable. The experimental design was the
same for all three judgmental domains (age estimation, quantity
estimation, and general knowledge questions).
The participants sat alone in front of a laptop in a
silent laboratory. The experimental instructions (which included
information that the participants for each item were to decide
whether the target value was more or less than a comparison
value) were identical for all participants, but additional
TABLE 1 | Questions and stimuli used in the study.
Actual
value
Low
anchor
High
anchor
General knowledge questions
Length of Göta Kanal (a Swedish canal) 191 km 134 248
Population of Växjö (a Swedish town) 85 000 59 500 110 500
Height of Kilimanjaro 5 895 m 4 127 7 664
Number of babies born in Sweden in 2013 112 286 78 600 145 972
Height of tallest oak tree in Sweden 36 m 25 47
Meat eaten/year by the average Swede 49 kg 34 64
Distance from Luleå-Falun (Swedish towns) 830 km 581 1 079
Maximum speed of house cats 50 km/h 35 65
Items for quantity estimations
Macaroni 663 464 862
Cashew nuts 166 116 216
Plus–Plus (building blocks for kids) 151 106 196
Small beads 268 188 348
Carpentry nails 137 96 178
Stones 95 67 124
Maxi beads 378 265 491
Matches 114 80 148
Items for age estimation
35 years old (two males) 35 25 46
47-year-old male 47 33 61
28-year-old male 28 20 36
46 years old (two males) 46 32 60
33-year-old male 33 23 43
42-year-old male 42 29 55
information differed depending on the experimental condition
(Source credibility). The low credibility group was informed that
the comparison values were randomly selected and therefore
not informative of the actual values of the targets (following
a commonly used method to reduce ascribed informativeness
of the anchors, e.g., Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Wegener
et al., 2001). The high credibility group was given the following
information: “The comparison values are answers from an expert
on this type of judgments. The expert’s answers have previously
been shown to be close to the actual values of the targets in similar
tests. However, that does not necessarily mean that the expert’s
answers are as accurate in this test.” The control group received
no information about the choice of anchor values.
Next, participants were asked to complete three tasks
(estimations of age, estimations of quantities, and answers to
general knowledge questions) in a block design. The order of the
blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
For each item, participants were first asked to answer a
comparative question about whether the target value was higher
or lower than a comparison value (anchor value) and were
then asked to provide an absolute estimate of the target value.
A low anchor was used in half of the trials and a high anchor
was used in the other half. Anchor values (high and low)
for each item were set at 130% and 70% of the true target
value, respectively, and were counterbalanced across blocks and
participants.
Cognitive load was manipulated by having participants
memorize a letter string presented before each question (see
Kruger, 1999; Gilbert, 2002; Epley and Gilovich, 2006) for half of
the estimates. Before the comparative question, participants were
informed that on the upcoming screen they would be presented
with either a blank screen or a string of eight consonants that
they should memorize and rehearse. The importance of trying
to remember the letters as well as possible was emphasized.
The blank screens/letter strings were presented for 7 s. Next,
participants were first given the comparison question and the
absolute question and then asked to report the letters (if
any) they were given earlier. This cycle was repeated for each
item, with half of the items of each estimation type (age
estimation, quantity estimation, or general knowledge questions)
being presented under cognitive load and half without. The
order of the conditions (cognitive load/no cognitive load) was
counterbalanced across participants.
Dependent Variables and Statistics
Unreasonable estimations (e.g., an estimation of the number
of babies born in Sweden in 2013 as 98 when the correct
value is 112 286) were classified as keyboard slips and removed
before the analysis. Together with missing data, 2.2% of the
data were lost, and replaced with the mean value for the
corresponding condition (i.e., a missing estimate from a female
participant estimating age under cognitive load in the high
credibility condition was replaced with the mean value for all
female participants’ age estimations under cognitive load in the
high credibility condition). After that, 1.2% of the data were
identified as outliers by using the outlier labeling rule with
g’ set at 2.2 (Hoaglin and Iglewicz, 1987). These data were
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replaced with the mean value for the right condition (see above).
Because different items in each domain (particularly in general
knowledge questions) were estimated on different scales, quota
values (estimated values divided by true values) were used as
the dependent variable in the analyses. Quota values under
1 represent underestimations, quota values over 1 represent
overestimations and quota values equal to 1 represent accurate
estimations.
RESULTS
General Knowledge
Participants gave generally higher estimates to the general
knowledge questions when given high anchors (M = 1.17,
SD = 0.25) than when given low anchors (M = 0.74, SD = 0.15).
This was confirmed by a 2 (Anchor value: high or low) × 2
(Cognitive load or no load) × 3 (Source credibility: high,
low, or control) Analysis of variance with Anchor value
and Cognitive load manipulated within subjects and Source
credibility manipulated between subjects. The analysis revealed
a significant main effect of Anchor value [F(1,141) = 318.5,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.69], but no interactions between Source
credibility and Anchor value or between Cognitive load and
Anchor value. The main effects of Cognitive load and Source
credibility did not reach statistical significance.
Age Estimation
For age estimates, participants generally produced higher age
estimates when given high anchors (M = 1.10, SD = 0.10)
than when given low anchors (M = 0.93, SD = 0.11),
F(1,141) = 162.52, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.54. There was also a
main effect of Source credibility [F(2,141) = 6.26, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.08], such that participants in the high credibility group
gave higher estimates (M = 1.04, SD= 0.07) than participants in
both the low credibility (M = 1.00, SD= 0.06) and control group
(M = 1.00, SD= 0.06). The failure to find an interaction between
Anchor value and Source credibility indicates that the magnitude
of the anchoring effect did not vary with different levels of
Source credibility. There was no effect of Cognitive load, nor any
interaction between Anchor value and Cognitive load. Thus, age
judgments are no different from general knowledge questions in
this respect, despite the difference in task characteristics.
Quantity Estimations
Participants gave generally higher quantity estimates when
given high anchors (M = 0.80, SD = 0.27) than when given
low anchors (M = 0.60, SD = 0.14), F(1,141) = 112.79,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.44. There was also an effect of Source
credibility [F(2,141) = 3.99, p = 0.021, η2p = 0.05], revealing
that participants in the high credibility condition gave higher
estimates (M = 0.76, SD = 0.19) than participants in the
control group (M = 0.65, SD = 0.18). A difference in anchoring
magnitude depending on Source credibility was not supported in
that there was no interaction between Anchor value and Source
credibility. A main effect of Cognitive load was also found in
these estimations [F(1,141)= 10.45, p= 0.002, η2p = 0.07]. More
specifically, participants made lower estimates under cognitive
load (M = 0.68, SD= 0.21) than without (M = 0.73, SD= 0.20).
A difference in anchoring magnitude depending on Cognitive
load was not supported as indicated by the absence of an
interaction between Anchor value and Cognitive load. Hence,
anchoring in quantity estimations behave in similar ways as
anchoring in age estimations and responses to general knowledge
questions.
DISCUSSION
Strong effects of anchoring were found in all three judgmental
domains under study, irrespective of cognitive load and
information about source credibility. Thus, we show that
anchoring can occur even in domains that are strongly visually
based and for estimations made with rather high certainty (age
estimations) as well as for estimations with a low level of semantic
content (quantity estimations). Our results are compatible with
the process behind anchoring being predominantly automatic
and unconscious. The fact that the present study manipulated
anchor values within subjects instead of between subjects as
in most other studies on anchoring makes the contribution
particularly strong. In addition, the design of employing repeated
measures in each domain indicates high reliability of the
findings.
The lack of an interaction between cognitive load and
anchoring on general knowledge questions corroborates earlier
research by Epley and Gilovich (2006), which has shown that
cognitive load does not affect anchoring (measured in terms of
adjustment) to experimenter-provided anchors. Here, we extend
this research with a more traditional measure of anchoring. The
results for anchoring in all three domains under investigation are
compatible with perspectives that regard anchoring as originating
from System 1 processes, processes that are fast, automatic and
unconscious (e.g., Chapman and Johnson, 1999; Frederick et al.,
2010).
The phenomenon of subjects being influenced by anchors
in their answers to general knowledge questions even when
the anchors are said to be randomly generated is well-
documented (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Strack and
Mussweiler, 1997; Chaxel, 2014). Nevertheless, whether there
is a difference in the magnitude of the anchor effect between
standard information about randomly chosen anchor values
and no information at all has never been investigated before.
We found no indication of such a difference as there was
no interaction between source credibility and anchoring in
any of the judgmental domains. Thus, based on our findings,
the practice of informing the participants that the anchors
are randomly selected seems ineffective. Although the lack of
interaction between source credibility and anchoring seems
somewhat reasonable in regards to estimations in the two
visual domains, where the subjects have the object to be
estimated right in front of their eyes, it is noteworthy that
it for answers to general knowledge questions did not matter
even whether the anchors in the present study were said to be
randomly generated or originated from estimates by an expert in
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the field. This is in contrast to Dowd et al. (2014) who found that
participants placed higher weight on the anchor in their answer
to a question about distances between cities when the anchor was
said to come from geography students compared with fine arts
students. However, Dowd et al. (2014) analyzed their data using a
“weighting average” and not in terms of classical anchor effects.
Also, their questions were supposedly more difficult than the
ones used in our study, which may have made their participants
more willing to accept the suggestions from the high-credible
sources. Wegener et al. (2010) discussed another study in which
participants showed more anchoring to credible than to non-
credible sources, but because they referred to unpublished raw
data, no conclusions on possible explanations to the difference
in results can be drawn. At this point, data on the effect of
source credibility on anchoring are inconclusive. However, it is
an important issue because an interaction of source credibility
and anchoring would be hard to conceive as being the result of
an automatic and unconscious process. Therefore, more research
is needed on the effects of source credibility on anchoring.
The credibility of the expert can be instantiated in more
detail than what was done in our study, with details that might
increase the trustworthiness of her expertise. For example, one
can elaborate more on the nature of her expertise by describing
her previous experience (c.f. Glöckner and Englich, 2015). There
is also a chance that an anchor point closer to the targets’ true
values would appear as more credible, at least for age estimates.
But as there was no interaction with credibility for any domain,
it is not likely that the distance between the true value and the
anchor provided by the expert was responsible for the lack of
interaction with source credibility in this study.
This is the first demonstration of classical anchor effects
in age estimation. It is of theoretical importance because age
estimates, in contrast to previously researched domains, are
strongly visually based and made with rather high certainty.
Thus, the boundary conditions for anchoring have been further
extended. The absence of an interaction between cognitive load
and anchoring in age estimations suggest that the anchoring
processes in this domain is similar to the process in classical
anchoring tasks (e.g., general knowledge questions). Effects of
anchoring in age estimation are also of applied importance.
Eyewitnesses are often asked to estimate the age of the perpetrator
(van Koppen and Lochun, 1997; Pozzulo and Warren, 2003), and
if the witness hesitates in their estimation, the police may ask
further questions including suggestions or comparative questions
which may lead the witness to anchor their estimation to the
proposed value. Because of this, effects of anchoring should be
considered when questioning eyewitnesses of information such
as the age of a culprit.
Evidence of anchoring in quantity estimations is important,
as quantity estimations are mainly based on visual stimuli and
are low in semantic cues, which together with the results on
age estimations extend the boundary conditions for anchoring.
Importantly, because there was little semantic information
at hand in the quantity estimations, anchoring in quantity
estimations can hardly be explained by the Selective Accessibility
Model. Instead, more numerically focused perspectives (e.g.,
Wong and Kwong, 2000; Oppenheimer et al., 2008; Frederick and
Mochon, 2012; Sleeth-Keppler, 2013) seem better fitted to explain
anchoring in these judgments. Previous results questioning the
Selective Accessibility Model have mainly used methods other
than the ones used in the standard anchoring paradigm. Our
results add to previous findings by demonstrating situations
where the Selective Accessibility Model is not applicable, despite
the use of the standard anchoring procedure.
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